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Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity  






This paper aims to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the degree to which 
public policies support gender equity in paid work and care. Combining the distinction 
between commodification and decommodification and the distinction between 
defamilialisation, supported familialism, and familialism by default our study identifies 
a number of relevant policies, ranging from services, leave entitlements, income support 
measures, and fiscal instruments to forms of acknowledgement of care work in pension 
systems. Although our main objective is conceptual, we offer a comparative overview 
of these policies for all of the EU countries, plus Norway. Thus, we provide a 
preliminary typology of policy approaches.  
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1. Introduction 
Interest in the way policies promote or hinder gender equity in the family and on the 
labour market is hardly new. Most studies have, however, considered only a small set of 
policies, or even just one policy, rather than looking at the interactions between 
different policies that intervene in the same area. In this paper, by using an 
intergenerational responsibilities perspective, and by looking at both financial and care 
responsibilities, we aim to develop and test a conceptual framework that will enable us 
to take an integrated approach to assessing gender equity that encompasses a variety of 
policy measures and spheres.  
We are aware that policies are only one part of the overall gender equity (or 
inequity) system. They interact with the labour market, family and gender cultures, and 
country-specific forms of class inequality (e.g., Cooke 2011, Crompton and Lyonette 
2007; Lewis, Campbell, and Huerta 2008; McDonald 2009, Orloff 2009a). The 
relationship between these different contextual dimensions is neither one of pure 
causality nor one of pure autonomy. Nonetheless, since policies—regardless of their 
partiality—are structuring factors in the context-specific system of the resources and 
constraints within which individuals, households, and families develop their strategies, 
we seek to identify the implicit and explicit assumptions concerning gender-specific 
arrangements that shape the way policies directly or indirectly regulate responsibilities 
and obligations within families, and between families and the state.  
 
 
2. Background literature, theoretical framework, and research 
questions 
The literature on gender inequality as it affects opportunities to participate in the labour 
market and to achieve financial autonomy focuses mainly on the gender division of paid 
and unpaid work in the family. This aspect is perceived as being largely responsible for 
the stalled (Hochshild 1989), unfinished (Gerson 2009). or incomplete (Esping-
Andersen 2009) character of the “gender equality revolution.” Some authors emphasise, 
however, that unpaid work is not just a constraint on paid work, but also a valuable 
activity that deserves more social recognition (e.g., Knijn and Kremer 1997; Knijn and 
Ostner 2008). In an attempt to combine the two perspectives in order to develop a 
policy approach that fosters gender equity, Gornick and Meyers (2009) have argued that 
the dual earner/dual carer model resolves the tension between employment-focused and 
care-focused demands concerning both gender equity and women’s financial autonomy. 
According to this perspective, policies should a) support women’s labour force 
participation by partly relieving them of family-linked care responsibilities, b) Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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acknowledge the value of care work by providing both time and financial compensation 
for care giving, and c) support and incentivise men to share care responsibilities. 
The dual earner/dual carer model has three obvious limitations, quite apart from 
the fact that it is not a normatively universal model (e.g., Lewis, Campbell, and Huerta 
2008; Orloff 2009b). First, it presupposes that there are good jobs for all, so that 
working for pay is worthwhile in practice. Second, it is based on the assumption that the 
dual responsibilities of earning and caring are always shared by a couple. In reality, 
however, many individuals with earning and caring duties actually shoulder them alone, 
or at least not within a couple relationship. Therefore, from a gender-equity perspective, 
policies should be evaluated not only on the basis of whether and to what degree they 
encourage sharing within a couple; but also on whether they allow individuals, and 
particularly women, to set up their own households without being dependent on a 
partner (Hobson 1994; also see Orloff 1993), or, following O’Connor, Orloff and 
Shaver (1999), without being totally dependent on the state. It should be noted, 
however, that Bäckman and Ferrarini (2010) found that dual earner policies also 
indirectly support lone parents/mothers, protecting them and their children from poverty 
more efficiently than policies that support a traditional gender division of labour. Third, 
the conceptualisations of this model focus only on the care needs of (small) children, 
ignoring the fact that care needs (and the gender division of responsibilities around 
them) do not stop at early childhood. They are, rather, continuous and recurrent over the 
life course. And in ageing societies, they may again become particularly intense in the 
second half of life, when adults’ parents become frail. Research has shown that, in all 
countries, including those with the highest provision of services, the family, and within 
it women, are the main care providers for both children and the frail elderly, with or 
without the help of social services (Arber and Ginn 1995; Johansson, Sundström, and 
Hassing 2003, Kramer and Kipnis 1995; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004). Recent policy 
developments, such as the offer of payments for care instead of services, may, 
depending on the design, further increase the responsibilities of the family and of 
women within the family (Ungerson 2004; Ungerson and Yeandly 2007). 
In light of these analyses and debates, three dimensions of policies appear 
particularly relevant in shaping the institutional context in which men and women in 
families negotiate the division of responsibilities. Developing Orloff’s (1993) original 
suggestion, they may be conceptualised as being at the intersection of two parallel 
divides: commodification/decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999) and 
familialism by default/supported familialism/defamilialisation (Leitner 2003; Saraceno 
1997, 2000, 2010; Saraceno and Keck 2010).  
Decommodification—i.e., independence from the market for the satisfaction of 
one’s own needs—may in fact occur through access to either publicly or family-
provided resources, with different consequences both for class and gender inequalities. Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  374
Defamilialisation—i.e., independence from family support for the satisfaction of one’s 
own needs—may occur both through the market and through the welfare state, again 
with different consequences, particularly for social class inequalities. Furthermore, as 
Orloff (1993) and others have pointed out, in order to gain access to decommodification 
via the welfare state (e.g., to a personal old-age pension or maternity leave), women 
need to be able to enter and remain in the labour market; i.e., to be commodified. This, 
in turn, requires that the goods (care, housework) they provide within the family and for 
family members—i.e., in a familialised framework—are not only shared with other 
family members, but are partly outsourced, either to the market or to the welfare state.  
The dimensions emerging from this complex interplay that are particularly relevant 
from the perspective of gender equality are: 
 
a)  The degree to which policies allow women with family responsibilities to remain in 
the labour market, thus being independent of another person’s income, regardless 
of their care responsibilities; that is, the degree to which they allow women to be 
both “commodified” and “defamilialised” in their ability to provide for themselves, 
through, for example, the provision of services (defamilialised decommodification 
of care work) and paid leave entitlements (decommodified supported familialism); 
b)  The degree to which policies acknowledge caring for dependent family members 
(children, dependent adults, frail elderly relatives) as an activity giving entitlement 
to financial support in its own right (decommodified supported familialism), 
through, for example, care leaves and allowances, and care-linked contributions 
towards old-age pensions; and 
c)  The degree to which policies support men’s uptake of care responsibilities; for 
example, whether fathers are entitled to parental leave and whether there is a 
reserved quota for them (decommodified supported familialism for men).  
 
The first dimension in principle should also include positive actions, working 
hours policies, family-friendly enterprise policies, etc. (e.g., Den Dulk 1999, 2001). 
Within the limits of this paper, however, we can address neither the role of other public 
policies, such as anti-discrimination and positive-action measures, nor that of private, 
company-driven policies.  
Care leave entitlements are present in all three dimensions as a means of 
supporting labour market participation, of acknowledging the need and value of 
providing care, and of rebalancing childcare responsibilities between fathers and 
mothers. With regard to the first goal, previous studies have found the provision of 
parental leave to be decisive, but with contrasting impacts (Aisenbrey, Evertsson, and 
Grunow 2009; Bird 2003). Both “too long” and “too short” periods of leave have been 
identified as disincentivising mothers from remaining in the labour market (e.g. Lewis Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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2009; Van der Lippe et al. 2010). When the period of leave is long, employees are 
encouraged to take extended breaks from the workplace, thus weakening their ability to 
keep pace with changing job conditions. When the period of leave is too short, mothers 
may be forced to return to work earlier than they prefer or believe is healthy for their 
infant, thus making it difficult for them to balance work and care responsibilities. The 
opportunity to take leave may also have varying effects on women holding different 
positions in the labour market. Some studies have shown that having access to a (too) 
short period of leave can reduce fertility among the better educated, while it increases 
the likelihood that less educated women with low paid jobs will not return to the labour 
market (Esping-Andersen 2009; Waldfogel, Higuchi, and Abe 1999). A reverse effect 
may occur in the case of long but unpaid or low paid periods of leave. Mothers in a 
well-off household may be able to afford to take leave, while mothers in less affluent 
households may not.
3 Of course, whether a period of leave is seen as “too long” or “too 
short” depends to a large extent on the cultural and socioeconomic context. The 
UNICEF report “The child care transition” (2008), which is based on existing 
knowledge and research findings, sets the length of optimal leave—from the 
perspective of the child’s well-being—at one year with at least 50% of earnings.  
Incentives for fathers to share childcare have been introduced very recently in most 
countries. Data on the use of time (see Aliaga 2006; Gershuny and Sullivan 2003) 
suggest that, in countries where they have been in place since the 1970s, such as 
Norway and Sweden (Leira 2006), fathers do take over a greater share of childcare 
responsibilities, but, unlike mothers, without reducing their paid working time in the 
medium or long term. Furthermore, in these countries (and in Denmark), the partial 
closing of the gender gap in family childcare seems to be more a consequence of partial 
defamilialisation through services than of a substantial gender rebalancing within the 
household. Public policies thus appear to be a crucial instrument for gender equity, 
more because they relieve mothers of part of “their” tasks (i.e., through decommodified 
defamilialisation of childcare) than because they incentivise fathers to take on a larger 
share. However, according to Sullivan et al. (2009), who compare Sweden, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom, incentives to take a (comparatively long) leave seem to have a 
long-term impact on caring behaviour. In particular, in Sweden, where parental leave 
can be taken up to the child’s eighth birthday, fathers take about the same amount as in 
Norway (where all leave must be taken within the first year), and more than in the UK 
(where there is no reserved quota for fathers and there is no payment). But Swedish 
fathers take leave in a less concentrated form than in Norway. This results in a higher 
availability of fathers to care for their children, even beyond the leave period. 
 
3 An issue we do not address here is the fact that many working parents are not entitled to parental leave at all 
because of their contractual conditions. Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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We focus in our analysis both on policies concerning the presence of young 
children and on policies addressing the financial and (non-health) care needs of the old. 
We also consider the implications of fiscal policies, as well as the design of income 
transfers to families and of pensions for the gender division of responsibilities, as 
suggested by various authors (e.g., Bäckman and Ferrarini 2010; Dingeldey 2001; 
Sainsbury 1996). Finally, unlike most recent studies that have focused on parental leave 
as the key policy for assessing the degree of gender egalitarianism (or gender equity) of 
parental policies (e.g., O’Brien 2009; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010), we focus not 
only on individual policies, but also on their interaction and combination.  
Our aim is not to construct yet another welfare state typology. Such an endeavour 
would fail to provide reliable results, given the multiplicity and complexity of the 
policies involved and of their interaction, which render the “technical” decisions 
implicit in any typologising exercise even more arbitrary than when only very few 
policies are considered (see Scruggs and Allan 2008). Moreover, constricting 
complexity in a typology would lead us to hide precisely that which we wish to 
elucidate: the country-specific policy rationales with regard to the various distinct 
dimensions delineated above. These rationales may differ not only across countries, but 
also within countries, depending on the specific dimension and policy involved. 
Instead, we aim to conceptually clarify the gender dimension of the policies we analyse, 
and to empirically detect commonalities, differences, and even inconsistencies; not only 
across, but within national policy frameworks. Our work is intended to provide both a 




3. Methods and data 
We use the Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policy Indicators (see Keck, 
Hessel, and Saraceno 2009)
4, which covers a variety of policy areas and legal norms 
that shape the responsibilities of the generations to support each other either financially, 
or by providing care – to analyse a range of policy measures that represent the three 
policy dimensions described above (defamilialisation, decommodification, supported 
familialisation) and their interactions. Building on previous work (Saraceno and Keck 
2010), we first look at how policies assign responsibility for caring and income security 
 
4 Also see http://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/ (last accessed 16 April 2011). The database has been constructed 
on the basis of a careful comparison of multiple sources, including national informants. All sources are 
documented. Since the devil is in details, mistakes can occur in this database, even with cross checks. It 
would be greatly appreciated if such mistakes were pointed out to Wolfgang Keck, who is responsible for 
maintaining the database. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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to the family and/or to the state. We then look at whether patterns of public support (or 
lack thereof) for intergenerational responsibilities contribute to crystallising or, on the 
contrary, to redefining the gender division of labour and responsibilities. We focus on 
policy outputs; that is, on entitlements to and patterns of public support. We thus assess 
the “theoretical,” not the actual impact on gender equity. In order to determine the 
actual impact, we need to look at outcomes. Yet these are the result not only of policies, 
but also of the interplay between policies, social norms, social and individual values, 
labour market conditions, and general patterns of social inequality. In order to assess 
the specific impact of policies on outcomes within country-specific contexts, in-depth 
case studies, necessarily dealing with a smaller number of countries, are required.  
For reasons of space, we concentrate in the analysis only on a selection of policies. 
For decommodification via supported familialisation and its gender specificity, we 
consider the following: length of and compensation during parental leave, and how the 
use of leave by either parent is regulated; payments for care to be used by family carers, 
either because of the absence of regulation or because the regulation specifically 
stipulates that a family carer may receive some payment without being formally hired; 
leaves for workers with care responsibilities for a non-child family member; 
contributions towards old-age pensions during caring periods; child benefits that, 
depending on their design, may or may not constitute a disincentive for having a second 
earner in the family; forms of taxation that benefit financially asymmetrical married 
couples; and survivor pensions. This last measure is particularly important for women, 
especially those in the older cohorts, since they are less likely than men to have access 
to a work-linked old-age pension.
5 
For the decommodified defamilialisation of caring needs, we look at the following: 
coverage rates by publicly financed childcare services (focusing on children under age 
three, since this is where cross-country differences are greatest), and coverage rates by 
publicly financed home and institutional care services for the frail old.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Gender and childcare responsibilities 
Mothers’ and fathers’ life course paths are clearly differentiated following the birth of 
children, and, in particular, during the initial years after childbirth (Lalive and 
Zweimüller 2005; Waldfogel, Higuchi, and Abe 1999). Fathers – regardless of the age 
 
5 For reasons of space, but also because of a lack of good comparable data on all EU countries, we do not 
address the issue of policies (and their change over time; e.g., Skevik 2005) for lone mothers with small 
children. Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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or number of children – have higher employment rates than childless men of the same 
age. The opposite is the case for women, although to a varying degree, depending on 
the country. However, whereas for mothers a large range of studies show that having 
children decreases labour market participation, the evidence for the assumptions that 
men increase working time or employment in response to becoming a father is less clear 
(for opposing views, see, for example, Bielenski, Bosch, and Wagner 2002; Cooke 
2011). There is, however, clear evidence that (full-time) employed men are more likely 
than non-employed men to become fathers (Blome, Keck, and Alber 2009).  
From the perspective of mothers’ labour force participation, leave entitlements and 
services must be considered jointly. Furthermore, not just the duration of the parental 
leave, but also the level of compensation during the leave is important. In some 
countries, periods of parental leave may be long, but with little or no payment; in 
others, payment is reduced after a given period, and so forth. To obviate this difficulty, 
the concept of “effective parental leave” has been developed, which weighs the duration 
of leave against the duration and level of compensation (Plantenga and Remery 2005; 
Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; Saraceno and Keck 2010; UNICEF 2008).
6 With 
regard to childcare, since we are interested in the degree to which childcare 
responsibilities are shared by the state, we consider only public (or publicly financed) 
childcare coverage rates (Figure 1). In order to combine the two forms of support, 
coverage rates for children aged 0-2 are measured in weeks. More precisely, we 
calculated, given the country’s coverage rate, how many weeks a child could attend 
public childcare if all children were enrolled. If, for example, the coverage rate of a 
country is 30%, the available time period for each child in the population under age 
three would be 46.8 weeks (156 weeks / 100 * 30). We are aware, of course, that in 
reality there are children who attend full-time while others do not attend at all, that the 
proportion of working mothers differs across countries, and that not all parents are 
entitled to maternity and parental leave; and, finally, that the two time measures – those 
of leave entitlements and of childcare – are not fully homogenous. However, this 
exercise provides us with a rough measure of the degree to which there is public 
responsibility for childcare, either in the form of services or of leave entitlements. 
 
6 The measure of effective parental leave has two important limitations. First, it results in an equalisation of 
countries with long leave periods and low payments, and countries with shorter leaves and high payments, 
which of course represent very different policy approaches. Second, effective parental leave does not take into 
account the fact that some countries differentiate the level of compensation over the leave period, combining 
an initial, well paid period with a longer, low paid or unpaid period. All of these different measures are 
detailed in the appendix (see Table A1). The French case is complex, since the leave is paid only for six 
months for the first child, but up to three years for second and subsequent children. In this calculation, we 
considered the second alternative. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
Figure 1:  Effective parental leave time * and childcare coverage for children 
under age three** 




























Effective parental leave Coverage 0-3 Early care gap
 
 
Source:  Multilinks Database, own calculations. 
Notes:  * Including the portion of leave reserved for mothers after childbirth, which in most but not all countries is often a separate 
kind of leave, usually defined as maternity leave.  
** in weeks per child on the total population of children under age three. 
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Overall, the longest effective leave periods are found in some of the former 
communist countries of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Estonia; 
followed at a distance by France, Finland, and Norway. The shortest effective leave 
periods are found in Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. Public childcare provision covers over 33% of children 
aged 0-2 in the Scandinavian countries and in Belgium and France. Childcare coverage 
remains low in Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and Poland. 
Combining the two measures, we find that no country provides comprehensive 
publicly supported care coverage throughout a child’s first three years. The gap 
between the end of paid leave and the availability of childcare is smallest in Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and France. In these countries, public policies generally 
support the employment of parents/mothers with a small child, showing coherence and 
continuity in their instruments, although they suggest a different timing and balance 
between supported familialisation and (partial) defamilialisation. To a lesser degree, 
and with a bias towards supported familialism, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and 
Estonia also show a small care gap over the first three years of a child’s life. By 
contrast, there is a substantial gap for the under-threes in Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Cyprus, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands; and this gap is only slightly smaller 
in the other countries (also see Saraceno and Keck 2010).  
We are fully aware that further cross-country differences exist, for example, 
concerning the opening hours of childcare services and the level of co-payment 
required. There is, however, only very limited comparative information available about 
these issues (European Commission 2004). Data from the EU-SILC survey provide 
information on average weekly hours spent in childcare services, without distinguishing 
between public and private facilities (Figure 2). Hours of attendance may, however, 
depend on opening hours, the amount of service time granted to parents given their 
working time (as in Germany), cost, or preferences. 
 Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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Note:  The results are not weighted because in some countries no population weights are given for children born in 2006. 
Source:  EU-SILC 2006, authors’ calculations. 
 
We may detect a clear distinction between two groups of countries. In the first, the 
majority of children attend childcare on a (sometimes very short) part-time basis. This 
is particularly true for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but also for Austria, 
Germany, Cyprus, Spain, and Ireland. With the exception of Cyprus and Spain, all of 
these countries have comparatively high part-time employment rates for mothers 
(European Commission 2009). Belgium and Luxembourg, which also have high part-
time use of childcare (BE 24%, LU 33%), are close to this group. In the second group 
of countries, children mostly attend childcare full time. This is especially the case for 
Portugal, Denmark, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland – all countries in which the 
part-time employment rate of mothers with children under age six is less than 10%. 
Poland and Hungary are also close to this second group, and have similarly low part-
time employment rates. However, the intra-group similarities in childcare time use, as 
well as in the incidence of part-time work for women/mothers, hides in some cases 
substantial differences in coverage rates, on the one hand; and in women’s/mothers’ 
labour force participation rates, on the other. In Poland and Portugal, for example, far 
fewer children attend childcare than in France or Belgium, given the lower coverage, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
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4.2 Leave options for fathers 
Assessing the gender equity of parental leave is not a self-evident process. While 
differing with respect to the specific technical measurements used, O’Brien (2009) and 
Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2010) assess the degree of gender equity on the basis of the 
extent to which non-transferable leave rights and benefits are granted to men as well as 
to women, on the one hand; and of the nature and incentives for male uptake, on the 
other. From the point of view of this approach, gender neutrality and the lack of a 
specific allocation of leave time to either parent would count as less gender-equal than a 
50-50 division of leave time between the two parents. But in McDonald’s view (2009), 
the reverse is true; in particular, any specific allocation of time to fathers is perceived 
here as gender-specific, while neutrality and free use are not. We share O’Brien’s and 
Ray, Gornick and Schmitt’s position. We believe that gender neutrality and the open 
use of leave time will really be a matter of choice – with no impact on gender equity – 
only when men and women as parents and employers consider it normal that fathers 
also want and should be able to take time off to care intensively for a small child. Until 
then, fathers’ quotas are analogous to positive actions geared towards supporting 
women’s presence in the labour market, and are thus an equalisation measure. In 
addition to a reserved quota for fathers, the level of compensation also matters for 
fathers’ uptake of parental leave. On the basis of existing research, the UNICEF (2008) 
study sets this at around 60% or more of lost earnings.
7  
Figure 3 shows a) how much of the total parental leave is specifically reserved for 
fathers; and b) what share of the total leave fathers might theoretically take (in addition 
to, or without the reserved quota) is compensated at 60% or more of individual monthly 
earnings.
8 This measure is different from that of effective leave, since it looks at the 
portion that is actually compensated at a given level. We believe that the actual level of 
payment is likely to be a crucial factor in a father’s decision to take leave. Countries 
may be divided into three groups. The first group offers well paid leave for several 
months, which can be shared between parents. It includes the Nordic and some Eastern 
European countries, as well as Germany since the 2007 reform. Finland, Germany, 
Norway, and Sweden reserve a portion of the well paid leave time only for fathers. 
Luxembourg is close to this group, as the overall leave time theoretically open to 
 
7 Two other measures may encourage fathers to contribute to caring: paternity leave and flexible use of leave 
time. Paternity leave is available in many but not all countries, Usually this leave is restricted to 15 days 
maximum around the time of childbirth, and therefore may not affect the gendered division of caring. Flexible 
use of parental leave allows both mothers and fathers to stretch out its duration so as to meet the needs of 
children over a longer time span, while reducing the length of time spent away from work for each period of 
leave taken.  
8 Detailed information is given in the appendix (see Table A2). Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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fathers is somewhat shorter (six months maximum), while the income replacement is 
high, at 68% (in 2005). 
The second group is made up of countries that reserve a set amount of the parental 
leave for fathers, but – as for mothers – with no or only little income replacement. This 
group includes the Mediterranean countries of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, and 
Portugal (but not Spain); as well as Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands. Variations in the length of leave reserved for fathers are small. Cyprus, 
Ireland, Malta, and the United Kingdom do not offer any compensation, while the other 
countries offer around 30% income replacement.  
The last group includes countries that have neither a reserved quota for fathers, nor 
a good level of compensation (not included in Figure 3), and therefore lack both of what 
empirical studies have found to be the two prerequisites for incentivising fathers to take 
at least a portion of the leave. In particular, Poland and Spain provide income support 
during parental leave only on a means-tested basis. The other countries in this group 
offer very low compensation. 
Looking at Figure 1 and Figure 3 together, we can see that, only in the cases of 
Norway, Sweden—and to a lesser extent, Denmark and Finland—do the overall 
childcare packages offered by the government seem to support a combination of a high 
degree of partly de-gendered supported familialism with a high level of decommodified 
defamilialisation. In all of the other countries, either incentives to de-gender parental 
care or effective supported familialism or decommodified defamilialisation (or all three) 
are lacking, thus reducing the resources for an overall rebalancing of the gender 
division of caring responsibilities.  Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
Figure 3:  Reserved quota for fathers and total length of leave granted to 
fathers and paid at 60% of earnings or more (2009) 






















Reserved quota father high paid leave time eligible for fathers
 
 
Note:  Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain neither offer a period of well paid 
leave, nor set a quota for fathers, and therefore are not shown in the figure. In Austria, however, the payment of the 
childcare allowance may be prolonged by six months up to a maximum of 36 months if the father shares part of the leave 
time. The total length of p rental leave (24 months) is not, however, affected.   a
Source: Multilinks  Database  2010. 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  384Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
http://www.demographic-research.org  385
4.3 Gender-specific assumptions in support for care of the frail elderly 
Since families are the main providers of care, not only for children but also for the frail 
old, the generosity and design of long-term care policies are crucial in defining the 
responsibilities of families, and, particularly given the prevalent gender division of 
labour, of women within them. What is decisive from this perspective is the availability 
and affordability of publicly supported long-term care services; that is, the degree of 
decommodified defamilialisation of care. Research has shown, in fact, that while the 
number of family members who provide care does not differ substantially across 
countries, care intensity does. Intensity is lower in service-rich than in service-poor 
countries (Daatland and Herlofson 2004; Haberkern and Szydlik 2008). Public services 
thus relieve (especially poorer) family carers, who are mainly women, of some of the 
care work. 
Figure 4 shows coverage by institutional care facilities and home care services 
related to the population aged 65 years and over. It is a very crude measure, but the only 
available one at a comparative level for such a large number of countries. Country 
differences in coverage may be both a cause and an effect of a differential demand, 
driven both by a differential incidence of need and by conditions of affordability, 
quality, and preferences. Furthermore, the share of private means required to co-finance 
long-term care services differs across countries (Pacolet et al. 2000). Even with these 
limitations, the data in Figure 4 are consistent with what we know from the literature 
and more detailed policy descriptions concerning a smaller number of countries (e.g. 
Pacolet et al. 2000; OECD 2005; Theobald 2008). The Nordic countries, along with the 
Netherlands, appear to be the most both decommodified and defamilialised. At the 
opposite end, the Central and Eastern European (except for Estonia) and the 
Mediterranean countries (except for Malta) provide only scant long-term support 
through care services. Here, families (mostly the women within them) bear the main 
care responsibilities. If they have the means, they buy all or part of the required care 
work on the market (Lamura, Döhner, and Kofahl 2008).  Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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Source:  Multilinks Database; Saraceno and Keck 2010. 
 
 
While publicly supported services clearly simultaneously decommodify and 
defamilialise care work, payments for care may support either defamilialisation or 
familialism, depending on the design. For example, cash benefits may be paid to the 
care recipient in the form of a personal budget that must be used to purchase services 
under a formal contract/labour relationship. In this case, cash benefits are just as much a 
defamilialising instrument as the direct provision of services. Such benefits are 
provided in France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and, more recently, 
Portugal and Spain (see Table 1). In other countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, and Malta – the amount of the care allowance is low, and the allowance is 
paid directly to family carers, with neither social security coverage nor an option for 
receiving services instead. Given the low amount of the allowance, we might speak here 
of weakly decommodified supported familialism, with a large space for familialism by 
default, both of which rely on the availability of female family carers. The Czech 
Republic, Ireland, and Slovakia offer cash subsidies both for hiring professional 
services or for a family carer, and thus combine weakly decommodified supported 
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familialism with weakly decommodified defamilialisation. In Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and the United 
Kingdom, the care allowance is paid to care recipients, who can use it as they (or their 
family) wish. In this case, supported familialism is one of the possible outcomes, in 
which a family member provides care, either in exchange for some financial 
compensation or for free. The allowance may, however, be used to buy care services on 
the informal (often migrant) market, thus achieving a degree of commodified 
defamilialisation. According to observers, this is what happens, for example, in Italy, 
where the allowance is often used to pay a so-called badante (e.g. Bettio et al. 2006, 
Naldini and Saraceno 2008). Germany allows beneficiaries to choose between publicly 
financed services and cash payments. Here, supported familialism and defamilialisation 
seem to be balanced. However, data on the uptake of cash allowances or services 
suggest that supported familialism (with or without commodified defamilialisation) is 
dominant in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). 
 
Table 1:  Cash-for-care payments 
Cash-for-care payments  Countries 
No Greece   
Yes, unbound  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Spain 
Yes, formally bound, predominantly for 
professional service usage 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Spain 
Yes, formally bound, but only to pay family 
carers  
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia, 
Malta; Sweden 
 
Note:  National informants report that, in Spain, such allowances should in principle be used to pay for services, but since the 
supply of services is still meagre, a degree of discretion is tolerated. The same seems to apply in Portugal. Latvia and 
Estonia do not have a national law. Care benefits depend on regulations at the municipal level. In Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Ireland and Slovakia, both payments for services and payments to family carers are available. These countries 
are shown in two rows in the table and are marked with italics. In Denmark and Sweden, municipalities may formally 
employ a family carer of working age if (s)he is willing to care for a dependent family member, particularly if services are 
not available. This is rarely the case in practice because of the substantial provision of professional services (see Figure 3 
above). 
Source:  European Union 2010; Multilinks Database. 
 
 
Only in Greece, which is also one of the countries with the lowest level of service 
coverage in this field, are there no care allowances. This country, therefore, represents 
the extreme case of familialism by default in this field, since it relies heavily on the 
availability of family, and particularly women’s, solidarity.  
In all of these different solutions, the space for familialism by default is more or 
less ample, depending on the portion of care needs covered by services, or the 
generosity of the allowance, and on the level of disability that determines entitlement Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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(Rauch 2007, Saraceno 2010). In order to account for all of these very important 
dimensions, however, in-depth studies on a smaller number of countries are necessary. 
The traditional instrument of supported familialism in the case of childcare, leave 
for the carers, is also provided in most European countries for caring for a dependent 
person, but it is far less generous in terms of length and compensation. Unfortunately, 
in the available international sources (e.g. Council of Europe 2011) information is 
missing for several countries, and we have not yet been able to collect it through 
national informants. Available information in any case shows that there is a great 
heterogeneity both in entitlements and in the types of leave available. In Belgium, Italy, 
and the Netherlands, both short paid leaves and longer, partly paid leaves of several 
months are available. Germany, Austria, and Portugal also offer both leave options, but 
these are in general unpaid.
9 In Sweden, two months of paid leave is available if a 
family member is seriously ill, but no short-term leave is available. Other countries, 
such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, only offer short-
term paid leave (5-36 days per year). In the United Kingdom, there is no statutory leave, 
but the family directive stipulates that employers must allow employees to take unpaid 
leave in cases of family emergency. Some countries, like Cyprus or Latvia, do not offer 
a statutory care leave at all. In general, in all countries where such an option exists, little 
or no compensation is provided for taking a long leave. This reduces the uptake of 
leave, particularly among low income households, or when the potential carer is also 
the main or only breadwinner. Furthermore, analogously to what happens for parental 
leave, unpaid or low paid leave entitlements discourage men from taking leave. 
 
 
4.4 How gendered are the measures of financial support for families? 
Child allowances, which are intended to lower the cost of supporting children, are in 
principle gender-neutral if they are universal and not income-tested on a household 
basis. On the other hand, they may encourage the gender division of responsibilities 
with regard to earning and caring when they are income-tested by household, 
particularly when potential or actual earnings are very asymmetrical within the couple, 
or when the second income is too low to offset the value of benefits. A strict household 
income test for child allowances is applied in Poland and Spain. Other countries – 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia – 
gradually reduce the child allowance as the parents’ income increases, but a 
considerable amount is also paid to parents with average incomes. In Italy, there is a 
dual household income test: at least 70% of total household income must be earned in 
 
9 In Portugal, payment is provided for employees in the public sector. In Austria, financial compensation is 
provided on a means-tested basis. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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waged work (the self-employed are excluded), and both the entitlement to and the 
amount of the allowance are defined in relation to household income and size.  
Tax systems deal with unequal combinations of earnings between partners 
differently. Three approaches can be identified. The first is individualised taxation 
without any consideration of partners’ earnings. This is the approach found in Cyprus, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. In these cases, the tax debt is calculated independent of marital status 
or a spouse’s income. Whether there is an income differential between partners does not 
matter for the overall tax debt. There is no support for a (male) breadwinner/(female) 
family-carer model. The second is individual taxation with tax allowances or tax credits 
for the main earner when the spouse has no or a very low income. This is the case in 
Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. Indirect public financial support for a gender imbalance in earnings (and 
thus indirect support for a gender division of responsibilities) is only provided up to a 
certain income threshold for the partner with lower earnings. In this case, an increase in 
the income of the low or non-earning partner would be counterbalanced by a loss of tax 
benefits for the higher-earning partner, thus devaluing the earnings of the lower income 
partner. The third approach is joint taxation, either of the couple or the household. This 
has been adopted by Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, and Portugal. A couple-based joint taxation equalises the 
tax burden between the earners in the family. A household-based taxation (as in the 
French family quotient) divides the overall household income between all of the 
household members on the basis of a coefficient. In progressive tax systems, both forms 
of joint taxation may create substantial savings in the total amount of taxes owed, as 
well as in the amount of taxes owed individually by the higher earner if one of the 
partners earns considerably less than the other (and also, in the household-based system, 
if the household is large). However, an income increase on the part of the partner with 
lower or no earnings disproportionally increases the total amount of taxes due, which 




4.5 Acknowledging the gender division of labour and care work in the pension 
system 
Employment not only provides an (independent) income in the present; it also 
determines security in old age. This is of growing importance for the birth cohorts 
currently of working age, who will be affected by the pension reforms that have taken 
place in most European countries. Their pension claims will be more tightly linked to Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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their contributions, either because the principle of equivalence is strengthened within 
the public pension schemes or because a larger part of the overall pension will be based 
on second-tier occupational and private pension plans, for which claims are 
predominantly based on contributions (Holzmann, MacKellar, and Rutkowski 2003). 
According to some authors, this will further reinforce the already existing gender 
inequalities in the pension system, since women have more interruptions in their work 
histories and flatter careers, given their family obligations, and will therefore be less 
able to build up contributions (Ginn and Arber 1999; Ginn, Street, and Arber 2001). 
These developments may be cushioned to some extent by various policy measures, 
including basic universal old-age pensions independent of work and contributory 
history, income-tested social assistance pensions for those who are not entitled to a 
contributions-based pension, non-contributory equivalents for caring periods, and 
survivor pension benefits.  
These measures follow different rationales in general, and specifically with regard 
to gender arrangements. Basic universal pensions are both a means of 
decommodification and of defamilialisation of financial needs in old age, the degree of 
which depends, of course, on generosity. Minimum social assistance pensions are also a 
means of both decommodification and defamilialisation, but only for the poor. Non-
contributory equivalents in the public pension scheme may acknowledge the periods 
spent caring for children or for an adult while the carer was of working age (Anderson 
and Meyer 2006), thus decommodifying (i.e., delinking from the work history) a 
portion of the contributions. By increasing the pension wealth of family carers, these 
contributory equivalents also strengthen the financial autonomy of family carers in old 
age, thus contributing to their financial defamilialisation. These contributory 
equivalents may be additive, and serve to top-up employment-linked pension 
contributions; or they may be substitutive, and reward non-employment (Frericks, 
Maier, and De Graaf 2007). There is wide cross-country variation not only in the 
presence of such contributory equivalents, but also in the amount credited for the same 
activity (e.g., having had a child).  
Survivor pensions are historically an exemplary expression of the male 
breadwinner model and a form of ex-post (after the spouse’s death) supported 
familialism. While acknowledging the fact that, at least in the recent past, most women 
did not earn their own pensions while contributing to the welfare of their husbands and 
their families, survivor pensions indirectly promised them that they would be provided 
for in old age as long as they remained married. Since the 1970s, in most countries the 
opportunity to obtain a survivor pension has also been extended to husbands. In Cyprus 
and Hungary, however, survivor benefits are still only available to widows, not to 
widowers. In most countries, they are being phased out or rendered subject to an 
income test, or the duration of receipt is limited to a short period after the death of the Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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direct pension beneficiary, in the name of individual entitlement and of women’s 
financial autonomy. Nonetheless, women continue to shoulder most of the unpaid 
family work, and on average suffer a caring penalty in their individual pension wealth. 
In addition to the survivor pension, most countries also regulate how pension rights 
should be divided between the couple in case of divorce. Usually the non-earning or 
lower earning partner is entitled to a portion of the present or future pension, based on 
the duration of the marriage/legal partnership. The underlying logic for this entitlement 
is the same as that for the survivor pension: marriage/legal partnership builds up 
expectations and responsibilities, and in many cases is based on a gendered division of 
labour, which asymmetrically affects the financial resources of partners and their 
economic vulnerability to the end of marriage/legal partnership.
10  
The synthesis in Table 2 provides a rough picture of how past family care giving is 
acknowledged in old age, using the two indicators of survivor pensions and non-
contributory equivalents for periods of time spent care giving in the pension system. 
For the latter, given the presence of a high degree of variation in generosity, entitlement 
rules, and so on, we restrict our analysis to the availability of such non-contributory 




Table 2:  Survivor pensions and acknowledgement of care giving periods in 
pension schemes 
Acknowledgement of care in pension claims 
Modes of survivor benefits  Pension benefits for childcare and 
elderly care 
Pension benefits for 
childcare only 
No acknowledgement 
Income-related 60% and more  Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Poland, Slovakia 
Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, 
Portugal 
 
Income-related less than 60%  Czech Republic, Germany, Norway  Estonia, France, Greece, 
Latvia, Spain 
Malta 
Flat-rate payment  Ireland, Lithuania, United Kingdom    (Netherlands) 
No permanent payment   Sweden  Denmark 
 
Notes:  1) Data for Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, and Slovenia are missing. 
  2) In Cyprus and Hungary, survivor pensions are only granted to widows. 
  3) In several countries, the survivor’s own income is taken into account. In these cases, the table presents the highest rate 
available. 
Source:  Multilinks Data Base. 
 
 
                                                           
10 It should be noted that legal unions that differ from marriage do not in all countries entitle the partner to a 
survivor pension, where it exists, or to a portion of the partner’s pension if the union is dissolved. Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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In most European countries, there are both survivor benefits and the 
acknowledgement of care giving periods, at least with regard to childcare. Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovakia are the most generous in this respect. In 
these countries, the need for income security in old age through individual pension 
contributions is reduced in couples with a main breadwinner, provided the couple has 
lasted “until death did them apart.” Most of the Southern, Eastern, and Central 
European countries, as well as Norway, offer a similar package. However, Greece falls 
behind due to its low survivor pension level (only 35% of the original pension, down 
from a starting 50%, three years after the death of the spouse). Malta does not account 
at all for child or adult care giving periods. Lithuania, the United Kingdom, and Ireland 
provide only a flat-rate payment to the surviving partner; but all three do acknowledge 
time spent providing care for both children and adults. Denmark and Sweden follow an 
individualistic approach. In both these countries, there are no permanent survivor 
benefits, and only Sweden acknowledges childcare as creating an entitlement to 
additional benefits. In these countries, old-age security for both men and women is 
heavily based on individually paid work-related entitlements on top of a relatively low 
universal basic pension. In the Netherlands, married and unmarried (including same-
sex) partners share a couple-based basic pension. Survivor pensions and recognition of 
care giving periods may be part of the second-tier occupational pensions. 
Mention should also be made of the lower retirement age for women, which was 
the norm in most countries until a few years ago, and now remains in only a few 
countries. This highly gender-specific measure has been defended from at least two 
different perspectives: as a form of acknowledgement of the dual burden experienced 
by working women, and as a means of “freeing” women so they can take care of their, 
usually older, husbands and frail parents and parents-in-law (Franco 2002). Whatever 
the reasons for this age difference, the effect has been to further reduce the pension 
wealth of women. This trade-off may appear fair as long as women also have access to 
the pension of a spouse. But for women who do not, having to retire early may result in 
greater economic vulnerability in old age. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
As we expected, once taking account of the multiple dimensions and policies at the 
crossroads of familialism/defamilization and commodification/decommodification, we 
found that it is not only difficult, but also cognitively risky to try to cluster countries 
into clean, internally homogeneous groups, identified by clear and univocal policy 
approaches and goals. We were able to identify just three distinct approaches, each of 
which is followed by a number of countries. But within each group, countries tend to Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
http://www.demographic-research.org  393
differ in one or more policy, and some countries lie on the boundaries of two different 
approaches. Furthermore, a substantial number of countries appear to be so internally 
heterogeneous that allocating them to one or the other approach would be highly 
misleading. Thus, in seeking to understand the country-specific resources and 
constraints for achieving both gender equity and the acknowledgement of care needs 
and care work, it is more useful to look specifically at each country along the various 
dimensions. In Table 3, we have summarised the main policy dimensions we have 
considered here, grouping the countries which appear to be more similar, but without 
deleting their differences.
11 
The first policy approach which emerges with a fair degree of clarity is a mix 
between supported familialism and decommodified defamilialisation in the case of 
childcare, and decommodified defamilialisation in the case of care for the elderly. This 
approach is present in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. It clearly supports a dual 
breadwinner model, as well as the principle of individual financial autonomy for both 
sexes. Explicit support for a rebalancing of the gender responsibilities in care giving is 
also present in this approach, except in Denmark. In these countries, however, there is 
little acknowledgement of unpaid family work through contributions towards a pension, 
survivor pensions, leave for elderly care, or cash-for-care allowances.  
 
 
Table 3:  Country-specific policy approaches at the cross road of familialism/ 
defamilialisation and commodification/decommodification 
 
Decommodification 










of unpaid family  
care in contributions










4   Child  Old  
Strong DF+ weak SF                
Denmark  + -  ++  ++  =  - -  + 
Norway  + =  +  ++  +  + -  - 
Sweden  + -  ++  +  +  +  -  - 
Strong SF+ weak DF                
Austria  = +  --  +  -  ++  ++  + 
Czech Republic  ++ +  --  +  -  + +  ++ 
Germany  = +  -  +  +  +  +  ++ 
Estonia  + +  =  +  =  + -  + 
Hungary  ++ +  --  -  =  + -  - 
Lithuania  ++ + -  -  =  + +  - 
Luxembourg  = =  -  =  ++  ++  ++  ++ 
Slovakia  - +  -  -  -  ++  ++  + 
 
                                                           
11 Because of data gaps, we are not able to assess all EU countries. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania are 
excluded from this summary.  Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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Table 3:  (Continued) 
 
Decommodification 










of unpaid family  
care in contributions 










4   Child  Old  
Weak SF and DF                
Greece  = -  --  -  +  +  -  - 
Italy  - +  -  -  =  ++  -  + 
Latvia  = =  -  -  =  + -  - 
Poland  - +  --  -  -  ++  ++  ++ 
Portugal  - +  -  +  =  +  -  ++ 
Spain  - +  -  =/+  -  +  -  + 
Internally divergent                
Belgium  - +  ++  +  =  ++  ++  ++ 
Finland  + +  =  +  =  m  m  - 
France  + =  ++  +  -  + -  ++ 
Ireland  -- +  -  =  =  +  +  ++ 
Netherlands  - =  -  ++  +  - -  + 
Slovenia  + +  =  -  =  m  m  - 
United -Kingdom  - +  =  +  =  +  +  + 
 
Notes: DF= Defamilialisation; SF= Supported Familialism 
 
1 The value ++ is assigned when the effective leave is 72 weeks or over, + when it is between 52 and 71 weeks, = when it is 
between 26 and 51 weeks, - when it is between 15 and 25 weeks, and -- when it is below 15 weeks. 
 2  The value + is assigned when there is a care giving allowance that can be used freely or is specifically aimed at compensating 
a family member, - when no care allowance is available, and = when a care allowance is mainly provided to pay for professional 
services, but may also be used to contract (employ) family members who provide care. 
 3  The value ++ is assigned when coverage is 61% and over, + when it is between 40% and 60%, = when it is between 30% and 
39%, - when it is between 15% and 29%, and -- when it is below 15%. 
 4  The value ++ is assigned when coverage through services (directly or through allowances targeted to buy services) is 20% or 
above, + when coverage reaches 10% but is below 20, and – when coverage is below 10%. 
 5  The value ++ is assigned when the reserved quota for fathers reaches six months and is paid at 60% or over of lost wages, 
and + when the well paid quota reaches two months, but is below six months. The value = is assigned when the leave is well 
paid, but there is no reserved quota (or the quota is very short, as in the case of Finland); or when the reserved quota is 
substantial, but the parental leave is compensated at a low rate. The value – is assigned when there is neither a reserved quota 
nor good compensation for the parental leave. 
 6  the value ++ is assigned in case of income splitting, + when there are tax deductions for the financially dependent spouse, and 
- when there is individual taxation without recognition of the spouses’ income situation. 
 
 
The second comparatively clear approach is more ambivalent concerning gender-
specific expectations, given its strong orientation towards supported familialism and a 
comparatively weak decommodified defamilialisation through services, particularly for 
childcare. This approach is particularly evident in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, and Luxembourg. In Estonia, Hungary, Lituania, and Slovakia, the policy 
framework is similar, but somewhat weaker, since in these countries supported 
familialism is less generous. This approach apparently encourages mothers to remain in 
the labour market by granting lengthy job protection through long—and in some cases, 
very long—paid parental leave, but with reduced childcare coverage after the leave Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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expires, which makes it difficult in practice for mothers to return to work. Incentives for 
fathers to share a portion of parental leave are usually lacking or weak, with the 
exception of Luxembourg and post-2007 Germany. Defamilialisation of care for the 
frail old is also reduced, and preference is given to supported familialism through cash-
for-care payments and care leave entitlements. The negative trade-off in old age for 
women between earning and care giving is, however, partly compensated by survivor 
pensions and by non-contributory equivalents for periods spent caring for both children 
and the frail old.  
The third approach is taken by countries that give a large amount of room to 
familialism by default, since decommodification, through either supported familialism 
or defamilialisation, is weak. This approach does not actively support women’s 
financial autonomy, while offering limited protection from the financial costs of the 
gender division of labour. Greece, Latvia, Italy, and Poland—albeit in varying 
combinations—display this pattern most clearly. Poland has one of the shortest 
effective leaves, but also one of the lowest levels of childcare and elderly care coverage 
through services. It also offers no incentives for a gender rebalancing of childcare. 
Greece and Latvia provide a medium-range effective leave, and Greece also offers 
comparatively strong incentives for fathers, but few other measures that support care 
needs, either in the form of supported familialism or of decommodified 
defamilialisation. These two countries offer a weak level of support for caring for 
children through contributory equivalents, but the survivor’s pension is low. Italy has a 
less generous parental leave and weaker incentives for fathers, while having a low rate 
of decommodified defamilialisation for both children and the old. While in Poland the 
taxation and child benefit systems consistently disadvantage women’s earnings at the 
lower end of the income scale, in Italy and Spain there is a contradiction between 
individualisation at the level of taxation and the household income test for child 
benefits. Portugal, notwithstanding its comparatively high women’s employment rate, 
has a short effective leave, coupled with a low provision of childcare services and a 
fiscal system that supports asymmetrical couples. Within this group of countries, Spain 
and Portugal are the most dynamic, since in recent years they have attempted to raise 
the degree of defamilisation in the case of the frail elderly through payments for 
purchasing care services. 
While the boundaries between the second and third approach are actually a matter 
of degree, it is difficult to allocate a number of countries to any of these approaches, 
since they appear to be internally divergent between supporting a dual earner model 
through decommodified defamilialisation (even if it comes at the cost of not fully 
acknowledging unpaid family care) and a modified form of the male 
breadwinner/female carer model. France, for example, has a degree of defamilialisation 
of childcare that is very similar to that of the Nordic countries, and also comes close to Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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these countries in its elderly care policies. France also recognises care giving periods in 
the pension scheme (only for children, as in Sweden), but only as an alternative to 
work-related contributions, which is, indirectly, a way of defining caring as an 
alternative to being in paid work. Furthermore, the French fiscal system strongly 
supports asymmetrical couples. In the Netherlands, financial support and public long-
term care provision for the frail old take the first approach, while childcare measures 
(parental leaves and care services for children under age three) are more closely linked 
to the second approach. Belgium is a special case. With regard to taxation, 
acknowledgement of care giving in pension schemes, survivor pensions, and elderly 
care, it is close to the second approach. In the case of childcare, however, Belgium 
appears to be even more defamilialised than the Scandinavian countries. Childcare 
coverage is comparatively high, while paid parental leave is short. Finland, Ireland, 
Slovenia, and the United Kingdom occupy an intermediate position on all or most 
policy measures.  
The ambivalence and apparent contradictions found in many countries are not 
surprising, and not only because of the specific histories of the different policies and the 
relevant actors behind them. Norms and behaviours concerning the gender division of 
labour have started changing only fairly recently in many countries, affecting social 
policy frameworks that were more or less ready to integrate the demands emerging 
from these changes, particularly in times of budget constraints. As Bonoli (2007) 
observed, not only the institutional frameworks and their interest groups, but also the 
timing of change matters.  
The Nordic countries seem to offer the most consistent framework for promoting 
gender equality, but at the cost of little recognition of unpaid care work, except in the 
case of children (in Sweden). The second approach offers a much higher degree of 
acknowledgement of unpaid family care (and possibly of the wish to provide it), but 
within a framework which, with a fairly high degree of consistency, presumes and 
supports through supported familialism measures the gendered division of labour, with 
its ensuing costs for women’s labour market participation and financial autonomy. The 
third approach, with its low degree of both decommodified defamilialisation and 
decommodified supported familialism, is clearly the least promising from a gender 
equality perspective. It also strengthens social inequalities among households and 
among women, as the system of financial incentives and disincentives in taxation and 
benefits is particularly risky for lower income women and households. Moreover, the 
scarcity of services strengthens the economic differences between those who can afford 
commodified defamilialisation through recourse to the market, and those who cannot. 
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Austria  16  100 22 22 32.5  40.0  14.0 
Belgium 15 77  6  6 34  20.4  96.7 
Bulgaria 19 90 27 13.5  65  59.8  10.9 
Cyprus 18  75 3.3  0 0  12.0  27.6 
Czech  Republic  28  84  30.5 30.5 46  95.5  12.5 
Denmark 18  90  8  8 100 52.8  87.4 
Estonia  20 100  32.4 32.4 33.4  72.7  34.3 
Finland  17.5  81 32 32 30  55.9  32.8 
France  16  100  33.25 33.25 29  57.9 67.1 
Germany 14  100  34.2  14  66 49.4  15.9 
Greece 18  90  13 6  100  45.7  10.9 
Hungary 24 70 31 31.4  52  87.8  9.4 
Ireland 26  50  11 0 0  9.1  23.4 
Italy  20 80 11 11 30  30.3  17.5 
Latvia  16  140 18 18 46.85  41.7  25.0 
Lithuania  18  100 34 22 29.35  85.6  28.1 
Luxembourg  16  100 12 12 68  38.7  21.8 
Malta  14  19 6 0 0  2.7  : 
Netherlands 16  100  12  12  0  16.0  22.6 
Norway  9 100  34.5 10.5 80  63.1  57.7 
Poland 18  100  36 0 0  18.0  3.1 
Portugal 16  100  6  6 25  17.0  29.6 
Romania  18 119  21.9 21.9 30  50.0  : 
Slovakia  28  55  30.9 30.9 17  38.2  27.6 
Slovenia 15  100  8.5 8.5  100 52.0  42.1 
Spain 16  100  34.5  0  0  16.0  25.9 
Sweden  8.6  78 16 12 69  53.5  77.7 
United Kingdom  39  90  6  0  0  23.4  40.6 
 
Source:  Multilinks Database; for methodological and technical information see Keck, Hessel and Saraceno 2009. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 11 
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Austria* 22.2  0  0  30  34 30  34 
Belgium 0  3 3  31  6  31  6 
Bulgaria 25.5  0  0  65  13.5  65  16.5 
Cyprus 0  3.3  0  0  0  0  0 
Czech Republic  31.9  0  0  46  30.5  46  30.5 
Denmark 8  0  0  100  8  100  8 
Estonia 32.4  0 0  36.7  32.4  100  10.3 
Finland 32  0.5  0.5  32  24.5  71  5.2 
France 33.25  0 0  34  33.3  34  33.3 
Germany 34.2  0  2  67  14  67  14 
Greece 0  6.5  3  100  3  100  3 
Hungary 30.5  0  0 47  30.5  63  18.5 
Ireland 0  3.2  0  0  0  0  0 
Italy 0  5  5  30  6  30  6 
Latvia 22.2  0  0  16.6  22.2  24.4  10.2 
Lithuania 34.2  0  0 91  19.9  100  7.9 
Luxembourg 0  6  6  78  12  78  12 
Malta 0  3  0  0  0  0  0 
Netherlands 0  6  6  32  12  32  12 
Norway 8.5  14.5  14.5  35.5  34.35  100  6.7 
Poland 36  0 0  0  0  0  0 
Portugal 0  3 3  25  6  25  6 
Romania 21.9  0  0 58  19.9  58  19.9 
Slovakia 30.9  0  0 33  30.9  33  30.9 
Slovenia 8.5  0 0  100  8.5  100  8.5 
Spain 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Sweden 12  2  2  67.4  15.7  77  12.8 
United Kingdom  0  3  0  0  0  0  0 
 
Source:  Multilinks Database; also see Keck, Hessel, and Saraceno 2009. 
  * In Austria, the childcare benefit lasts longer than the parental leave, and can be obtained irrespective of whether the 
leave is taken. It lasts a maximum of 36 months, and six months are reserved for the father.  Saraceno & Keck: Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity 
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